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Few popular science news articles today attract as much 
attention or are communicated with as much flamboyance 
as those involving the neurosciences. Catchy but charged 
headlines such as “Obese Teens May Be Lacking in Brain 
Size, Not Willpower” (Rettner, 2010) or “Thought Police: 
How Brain Scans Could Invade Your Private Life” (Wise, 
2007) make the point. These popular accounts present 
rhetoric scholars with numerous opportunities for 
interrogating scientific understandings of the brain and 
their development through the discourses, practices, and 
materials of neuroscience. However, a strictly 
deconstructive approach, as Bruno Latour (2004) notes, 
can be viewed as intellectually hostile to the efforts of 
scientific researchers(p. 225-228).  Because neuroscience 
is a relatively new and diverse field, it is important to 
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consider both scope and audience when striving to make a 
contribution to a critical tradition in the humanities and 
social sciences. Such a contribution, we believe, entails not 
only sharing observations within one’s immediate research 
community, but also promoting truly interdisciplinary 
interactions between neuroscientists and rhetorical 
scholars.  In what follows, we offer a brief and general 
summary of the contemporary neurosciences. We then 
make a call for collaborative scholarship wherein 
neuroscientists and rhetoricians partner in order to 
examine the constitutive nature of language, perception, 
and consciousness. We close by advancing a four-part 
agenda for research at the intersection of rhetoric and 
neuroscience.  
 
Contemporary Neuroscience: Context And 
Practices 
Although the study of the nervous system dates back to 
antiquity, the second half of the twentieth century 
witnessed a dramatic expansion of investigations of the 
nervous system, emotion, and cognition. This growth is in 
large part due to the invention of axial X-Ray imaging, the 
electroencephalogram (EEG), positron emission 
tomography (PET), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
offering researchers the ability to conduct experiments on 
living individuals and to visualize processes occurring at 
different levels beneath the skull. These developments, 
combined with the experimental methods of cognitive 
psychology, led to advancements in understanding the tie 
between brain functions and mental activities (Raichle, 
2009).  It also moved the study of the brain from a largely 
structural one to a joint focus on structures and processes 
(Van Horn, 2004; Brown, 2010). This is pragmatically 
demonstrated in the work of Voss and Schiff (2009).  As a 
result of these recent advances, researchers have launched 
multiple investigations of the nervous system, emotion, 
cognition, and the interplay between them, establishing a 
multiplicity of new disciplines with names such as 
neuroengineering, neuroinformatics, and neuroeconomics. 
Indeed, neuroscientists are now “breaking bread” with 
those outside of the biological and medical disciplines, as 
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the editor of Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 
put it in the inaugural 2006 issue, and are seeking to 
develop multiple lines of investigation in tandem with 
emerging imaging technologies (Lieberman, 2006). This 
disciplinary fertility and availability of methods has pushed 
neuroscientists to explore a bevy of brain phenomena, 
from “neural mechanisms for mate choice” (Fisher, et al., 
2005) to “neuroanatomical sites for eating behavior” 
(Führer, et al., 2008) to the brain’s mechanisms for 
“perceptual decisions about complex visual forms” 
(McKeeff and Tong, 2006). The result of so much high-
profile research, as Jordynn Jack (2010) notes, is that 
“neuroscientific research findings are only gaining in 
popularity” (p. 412). Indeed, neuroscience studies have 
become a persuasive cultural form regularly “touted for 
their potential to transform advertising, political 
campaigns, and law,” while “… seem[ing] to offer concrete, 
material proof of concepts previously considered 
ephemeral, especially when claims are supported with 
showy, multicolored brain scan images” (Jack, 2010, p. 
412-413). Given neuroscience’s suasive capacity, rhetorical 
investigations of the texts, contexts, practices, and 
materials of the neurosciences are well-poised to help 
citizens, humanistic and social science researchers, and 
neuroscientists alike understand what is at stake in the 
processes of “coming to know” the nervous system, brain, 
affect, and cognition.  
A rhetorical perspective is not only valuable for 
revealing the “important, if not indirect way in which 
rhetorical considerations define the shape of modern 
science” (Ceccarelli, 2001, p. 169). It is also valuable for 
helping to uncover how such science is interpreted, 
understood, and made meaningful by varied audiences. 
Lisa Keränen explains that “whereas other branches of 
science studies consider the historical, philosophical, and 
sociocultural dimensions of science, the rhetoric of science 
focuses on how language affects scientific processes and 
understandings” (Karenen, 2010, 23).  Scott Graham offers 
a slightly different viewpoint, suggesting that material 
objects can exert persuasive influence and that rhetorical 
agency comes from a “material-semiotic network” 
(Graham 2009, 400). Whatever falls beneath the rhetorical 
umbrella in a given context, however, there is little doubt 
that discursive practices and material structures work 
together to express values, shape institutions, and offer 
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conceptions of what it means to be human. Accordingly, 
the neurosciences supply a rich set of data for rhetoricians, 
ranging from intra-scientific debates about the nature of 
synapses to popularized accounts of brain functioning.  
Rhetoricians have not always had such optimism for 
the possibility of collaborating with the cognitive and brain 
sciences. Traditional rhetorical problematics surrounding 
agency, choice, deliberation, and identity have until 
recently most often put rhetoricians starkly in the position 
of critical or even skeptical hesitation.  Since scientific 
discourses were often considered, as Alan Gross once 
famously remarked merely “rhetoric without remainder”, it 
did not seem that there was much room for rhetoric and 
the sciences to collaborate (Gross, 1997, 6).  That little 
more than ten years later one finds rhetoricians such as 
John Lynch asserting a need to resist “a logic of 
representation that undermines a full examination of 
materiality and the complexity of scientific practice” 
(Lynch, 2009, 435) indicates a promising move toward 
recognizing both the legitimacy of current scientific 
research in this area without accepting it uncritically. This 
more nuanced realignment among rhetoricians of inquiry, 
as well as a more receptive attitude among neuroscientists 
themselves, suggests that scholars in both disciplines may 
now find significant territories of mutual interest to 
explore together.  
 
Mutual Contribution: Engaging With 
Neuroscience 
It is our view that a specifically rhetorical engagement of 
neuroscience should be an engagement with neuroscience 
and should, therefore, be built as much as possible on 
cooperation and mutual exchange. The point is at least 
implicit in Jenny Edbauer Rice’s exploration of 
multidisciplinary works on “affect” (Rice, 2008).   She cites 
Lawrence Grossberg suggestion that “texts may have other 
effects than meaning-effects” and subsequently explains 
that rhetorical theorists ask many of the same questions as 
those individuals studying meaning using the tools of 
neuroscience (Rice, 2008, 201-202). In addition, Diane 
Davis points toward the possibility of engagement with 
neuroscience by expanding on Kenneth Burke’s appeal to 
neurobiology in his well-known formulation of 
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“identification” (Davis, 2008).  The discovery of mirror 
neurons, Davis argues, leads to a rethinking of Burkian 
identification as compensatory to division and recognizes, 
instead, the always already sociality of human being 
(Davis, 2008, 131-132).  
Of course, the extent to which rhetorical critics could or 
should mingle in the field of neuroscience will likely be 
debated well into the future and may face concerns about 
biological reductionism and essentialist thinking. Yet, it 
would be a mistake to ignore the materiality of bodies in 
the constitution of perception. Rhetorical scholars who 
take the advice offered by Jordynn Jack and L. Gregory 
Applebaum to “carefully analyze the work with a rhetorical 
as well as scientific lens” (should steer clear of these 
pitfalls (Jack & Applebaum, 2010, 414).  Alternately, they 
should avoid  "throwing out the baby of materialism with 
the bathwater of vulgar reductionism" as Cary Wolfe (1991) 
once said (Wolfe, 1991, 66).  In short, neuroscience 
research holds the potential to add a new dimension of 
understanding to traditional rhetorical concepts and may 
very well prove useful in helping transform or contribute to 
the exploration of meaning production and human 
identification. 
The call informing this paper—to avoid what may seem 
like an assault on neuroscience coming from the outside 
and to remain open to the potentials of neuroscience—does 
not require abandoning rhetorical principles or 
epistemological positions that rhetorical critics understand 
as integral to the analysis of science. In fact, given the 
current cultural import of neuroscience and the tendency 
for fMRI investigations to be situated as “uncritically real, 
objective or effective in the eyes of the public” (Racine et. 
al, 2005, p. 160), we affirm the need for a rigorous cultural 
rhetorical criticism. Nevertheless, by partnering with 
neuroscience researchers, critics will better understand 
who has a stake in the advancement of this research and 
why, while positioning themselves to explore the 
professional practices that allow neuroscience research to 
hold together and produce socially significant work. 
In addition, we believe that rhetorical scholars have a 
disciplinary perspective that may help neuroscience 
researchers to consider their unique goals in tandem with 
an audience’s expectations. On this point, however, it 
seems preferable to discuss strategies of scientific 
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communication from as local a position as possible; we 
hesitate to treat neuroscience monolithically and to 
broadly speculate in this paper about the “right” or “best” 
ways to communicate different kinds of neuroscience 
research agendas that each have what James Paul Gee calls 
their own big-C “Conversations,” or their own situated 
language patterns tied to specific social issues in particular 
cultural contexts (Gee, 1999, 94). In fact, David Gruber 
(2010) has argued that different neuroscience research 
agendas receive different treatment in the popular press 
and manifest different patterns of communication (Gruber, 
2010).  It is perhaps sufficient to say that rhetorical critics 
will likely find productive partnerships with neuroscience 
researchers who desire to investigate persuasion, appeal, 
ethics, and similar concepts in their work. 
 
Four Areas Of Future Research In Neuroscience 
And Rhetoric 
From our view, four key areas of research merit attention 
for rhetorical scholars. Although not exclusive or 
exhaustive, we see these areas as particularly deserving of 
rhetorical investigation. We offer corresponding citations 
as a starting point for interested researchers. 
1. The first area concerns how brain scan technologies, 
such as the CT, the MRI and the fMRI, are applied and 
interpreted and how the “interpretive boundaries” for 
neuroscience studies are configured and communicated.  
Anne Beaulieu, for example, describes how scientists use 
tropes that convert images into pictures of numbers in 
situations where brain representations seem too “intuitive 
and unscientific” (Beaulieu, 2002, 76).  Kelly Joyce shows 
how physicians present MRI images with “transparency, 
objectivity, and progress” when speaking to patients Joyce, 
2005, 439). In other words, an important vein of research 
will consider how scientific authoritativeness is 
discursively maintained and how neuroscience studies are 
taken as more credible than other forms of or claims to 
knowledge. Of course, neuroscientists also strive to better 
understand their own research practices (Raichle, 1998; 
Taber et al., 2005; Weisberg, 2008); indeed, because they 
are aware of the persuasive impact of their research and 
images neuroscientists see the value of a rhetorical analysis 
and are pursing partnerships with rhetorical studies 
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(Racine et al., 2005; McCabe and Castel, 2000, Jack & 
Applebaum, 2010). 
2. As Joseph Dumit showed in his three-year study of 
neuroscience researchers working with PET scans, “brain 
images make claims on us because they portray kinds of 
brains” (Dumit, 2004, 5, italics in original).  That 
neuroscience studies often compare brains is nothing new; 
typological practices make up much of the history of the 
neurosciences and have contributed valuable insights. 
Nevertheless, identifying where assumptions about 
classifications enter into research programs and 
exploring how grounds for separate classifications are 
established, as Dumit did, has serious political and cultural 
implications and forms a significant area of rhetorical 
concern (Jack, n. d.). 
3. In their 2009 article, “Critical Neuroscience: Linking 
Neuroscience And Society Through Critical Practice,” 
Choudhury et al. suggest neuroscience findings are 
complimentary to capitalist societies and fit with a 
“cultural focus on the individual and interiority” 
(Choudhury et al., 2009, 62).  Other cultural critics express 
concern that neuroscience research may serve as a 
technology of governmentality (Johnson, 2008; Thorton, 
2010).   Understanding how neuroscience agendas co-opt 
or promote larger cultural issues (Littlefield, 2009) and 
how they advance corporate or political interests (Slaby, 
2010; Choudhury et al., 2009) remains central to critical 
rhetorical work. 
4. A final area of concern lies in exploring how 
concepts of mutual interest to rhetorical scholars, such as 
reason and emotion, are defined and operationalized in the 
neurosciences (Jack & Applebaum, 2010).  Engaging 
research about the extent of interdependency among the 
human senses is an example (Porter et al., 2006).  Another 
is exploring the entwined relationship between the 
emotions and the intellect (Bechara, 2004; Tavares et al., 
2010).  These topics offer rhetorical scholars a chance to 
ask questions and be questioned, and to identify and 
question assumptions about the human brain-body 
relationship. 
For each of these “areas of rhetorical concern,” we 
maintain that neuroscience researchers and rhetoricians 
will benefit from ongoing, programmatic, collaborative 
projects. Although Papoulias and Callard have recently 
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pointed out the dangers of trying to develop a 
transdisciplinary approach that ends up using scientific 
work out of context with an insufficient or confusing 
“composite language,” they nevertheless encourage 
scholars to pursue disciplinary teamwork and offer an 
insightful recommendation for doing so (Papoulias & 
Callard, 2010,  33-34).  Papoulias and Callard argue that 
any encounter with another discipline “is also necessarily 
an encounter with the methodologies and processes of 
legitimation characteristic of the natural sciences. Any 
interdisciplinary gesture must explicitly address, rather 
than wish away, such supplementary traffic” (Papoulias & 
Callard, 2010, 50).  Because the task of the rhetorician is 
precisely to “explicitly address” the “traffic” of 
“methodologies and processes” across various divides we 
believe that rhetorical scholars are positioned to 
successfully build bridges across historically divided 
disciplinary modes of investigation; thus, we situate the 
advice offered by Papoulias and Callard as a call to enter 
the foray while staying grounded in a rhetorical 
perspective. 
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